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Lawson: Prelude to the Voting Rights Act: The Suffrage Crusade, 1962-1965

PRELUDE TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
THE SUFFRAGE CRUSADE, 1962-1965
STEVEN F. LAWSON*

The master civil rights narrative with which most of us are familiar recounts the
lone leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., directing a series of great events that
resulted in the Second Great Emancipation. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s,
newspaper headlines and television broadcasts followed Dr. King and his
desegregation campaigns through Montgomery, Birmingham, Albany, St.
Augustine, and the March on Washington. The history textbooks read by the current
generation of high school and college students, who were born well after the heyday
of the civil rights movement, generally follow these major campaigns first headlined
more than forty years ago.'
In similar fashion, the chronicle of the voting rights struggle usually starts with
Dr. King's campaign in Selma, Alabama and ends with the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Unarguably, Dr. King and the Selma protests played a critical
role, if not the critical role, in the final acquisition of suffrage for disfranchised
black southerners. Selma marked the culmination, yet that event was not the totality
of the battle for black ballots. It is important to remember that while highly
publicized episodes such as those at Selma were taking place, black and white
suffrage workers, led mainly by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), engaged in creative efforts
to break down barriers that prevented a majority of African Americans in the South
from registering to vote and participating in the electoral process. Members of these
groups mainly functioned out of the limelight, but like Dr. King, they too learned
the necessity of boldly catching attention of the public and pressuring national
representatives to take action to restore the right to vote.
This Article focuses on the success of suffragists in obtaining the Voting Rights
Act, one of the two most powerful pieces of civil rights legislation ever
enacted-the other most powerful civil rights legislation is, of course, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The results came from a combination of public and private

* Professor of History, Rutgers University. B.A., City College of New York; M.A., Ph.D.,
Columbia University. The author wishes to thank the National Park Service and the Organization of
American Historians for their assistance on an earlier version of this essay and Josie Brown for creating
the conference that inspired this paper.
1. See, e.g., 2 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID EMORY SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY

1509-13, (5th ed. 1999) (discussing major events in the civil rights movement); 2 PAULINE MAYER ET
AL., INVENTING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 933-34 (2003); MARK C. CARNES &
JOHN A. GARRATY, AMERICAN DESTINY: NARRATIVE OF ANATION 987-90 (2003) (previously general
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activity through both national and local efforts. Between 1962 and 1965, voting
rights workers launched a concerted suffrage crusade in the South that succeeded
both in registering a significant number of new voters and, even more importantly,
placing sufficient political pressure on hesitant federal government officials to
swing into action behind a potent voting rights statute. The struggle came at
considerable costs to participants, but the effort was one which paid rich dividends.
In 1962, after nearly a century of disfranchisement, an estimated 29.4 percent
of eligible African Americans in the South managed to register to vote.2 The
comparable figure for South Carolina was 0.8 percent. Still, 29.4 percent was not
an insignificant figure compared to the miniscule 3 percent registered in 1940.' This
more than 20 percent rise in black voting can mainly be explained by the judicial
dismantling of the lily-white Democratic Party primary in 19444 and the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which pertained mainly to voting discrimination,5
together with the efforts of black civic groups and civil rights organizations, such
as the NAACP, which organized voter registration drives. However, neither federal
involvement nor private campaigns had succeeded in enfranchising a majority of
African Americans. Faced with discriminatory literacy tests, biased registrars, poll
taxes, and intimidation, African Americans had to find a way to convince the
federal government to overcome the remaining entrenched resistance to their
unfettered right to vote.
In 1962, the Kennedy administration, with John F. Kennedy as President and
his brother Robert Kennedy as Attorney General preferred to use the courts to
expand the right to vote by increasing the number of voting suits brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1957.6 The Kennedy administration, by using the Judiciary,
hoped to make its presence in Dixie lightly felt. The administration also emphasized
the right to vote to avoid arousing loud confrontations provoked by protests for
desegregation, which gave the Soviet Union ample opportunity to portray the
United States unfavorably on the world stage during the Cold War.7

To push civil rights activists "off the streets," President Kennedy offered
financial incentives, backed by Department of Justice litigation, to undertake voter
registration drives.8 The administration also persuaded several philanthropic

2. STEVEN F. LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CivILRIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA

SINCE 1941, at 81 tbl.1 (2d ed. 1997). South Carolina fell below the average with 22.9 percent of
eligible blacks enrolled to cast a ballot. Id.

3. Id.
4. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651,664-66 (1944).
5. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and
42 U.S.C.).
6. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 77.
7. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 158 (2000).

8. See LAWSON, supra note 2, at 77-78; see also HARRIS WOFFORD, OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS:
MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES 159 (2d ed. 1992) ("[T]he new Voter Education Project... was given
prompt tax exemption.").
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foundations to finance suffrage campaigns. 9 In a series of meetings in June and July
1961, the government brokered negotiations between philanthropic organizations,
the Taconic Foundation and the Field Fund, and civil rights groups, the NAACP,
SNCC, CORE, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), National Urban
League, National Student Association, and the Southern Regional Council (SRC).' 0
By virtue of these negotiations, the SRC agreed to run the Voter Education Project
(VEP). The philanthropic organizations provided a million dollars in funding, and
civil rights groups furnished the personnel for voter registration drives throughout
the South." Wiley Branton, an Arkansas lawyer who represented nine black
students in 1957 in their attempt to integrate Central High School in Little Rock,
Arkansas, was appointed director of the project. 2
Having spearheaded the creation of the VEP, the federal government left the
distinct impression among civil rights groups that the government would furnish
protection to suffragists if and when they encountered danger. Although civil rights
participants never specifically heard the Department of Justice promise federal
protection for registration workers, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall
"apparently left the impression that the national government would intervene to
safeguard the activists' constitutional rights."' 3 In all likelihood, Marshall never
envisioned the kind of support civil rights activists wanted and needed to achieve
their goals, especially in those sections of the South where activists encountered
massive resistance. Rather than dispatch FBI agents or federal marshals to protect
harassed suffrage workers from police brutality and private terrorists, the Kennedy
administration filed suits in federal courts against discriminatory law enforcement
officers and voter registrars.' 4 The Justice Department contended that the FBI was
not a federal police force and that local officials were responsible for public safety."
The government may have been technically correct, although this point is arguable,
but its reasoning did nothing to safeguard voting rights workers from those very
police officials who violated their rights and intimidated them in the first place.
Relying on local law enforcement was not the Kennedy administration's sole
policy flaw. The administration's determination to secure voting rights through the
courts also fell short of the mark. Toward this end, the White House sustained a
self-inflicted wound-Kennedy appointed five men to judgeships in the Fifth
Circuit in the deep South who frustrated the government's chances of enforcing the

9. STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 261
(1999).

10. Id. The SRC promoted improved race relations in the South through conferences, research,
and publications. Headquartered in Atlanta, the group publicly endorsed desegregation and
enfranchisement by the early 1960s. See id. at 262; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 78.
11. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 78; PAT WATTERS & REESE CLEGHORN, CLIMBING JACOB'S
LADDER: THE ARRIVAL OF NEGROES IN SOUTHERN POLITICS 46 (1967).

12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 48; WOFFORD, supra note 8, at 159.
LAWSON, supra note 9, at 265.
See id. at 267; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81-82.
LAWSON, supra note 9, at 280.
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right to vote. 6 William H. Cox of Mississippi proved to be the worst. 17 A law
school roommate of James Eastland, the chair of the powerful Senate Judiciary
Committee, Cox openly referred to blacks as "niggers" and denounced Civil Rights
Division attorneys for wasting his time with "lousy cases."' 8 Although federal
courts of appeals reversed the discriminatory decisions of these judicial resisters,
Assistant Attorney General Marshall admitted that by their actions the judges "did
directly and deeply affect [the] pace" of litigation. 9 Unfortunately, for African
Americans, justice delayed was justice denied.
Despite these obstacles, between 1962 and 1964 the VEP made considerable
progress. In counties where the VEP funded voting drives, the names of 287,000
blacks were added to the suffrage rolls. 20 Throughout the South, an additional
680,000 blacks registered to vote, and the percentage of voting-age registered
blacks rose from just over 29 percent to about 43 percent. 2' However, the results
were uneven. In Florida, Tennessee, and Texas a majority of African Americans
succeeded in registering.22 Next came Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia, where 40 percent of blacks enrolled (The figure for South Carolina
was around 37 percent).23 Blacks had the least success in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, where less than a third had qualified to vote.24 Mississippi compiled
the worst record by far-less than 7 percent were registered.25
Black Mississippians endured great difficulties in cracking the solid edifice of
Jim Crow and disfranchisement. Civil rights supporters in Mississippi virtually
disappeared from public view 26 following the reign of terror in the mid-1950s that
led to the deaths of Emmett Till and voting rights activist George Lee. The historian
of the Mississippi civil rights struggle John Dittmer, quoted one activist as stating:
"[I]f you were a member of the NAACP you kept it kind of a secret. If you had any
kind ofjob or anything you couldn't let it be known. ' 27 As a result, Mississippi had

16. VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 277 (1971).

17. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 272; NAVASKY, supra note 16, at 277. The other appintees were
"E. Gordon West of Louisiana, Robert Elliot of Georgia, and Clarence Allgood and Walter Gewin of
Alabama." Id. at 15, at 277.
18. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 272.
19. Id. at 273.
20. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 80.
21. DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS
OF 1965, at 19, tbl.l-3 (1978).
22. Id.; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81, tbl.1.
23. GARROW, supra note 21, at 19, tbl.1-3; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81, tl.l, 2, & 3.
24. GARROW, supra note 21, at 19, tbl.l-3; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81, tbl.1.
25. GARROW, supra note 21, at 19, tbl.l-3; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81, tbl.l.
26. See generally JOHN DfrTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MissIssippi 53-58 (1994) (detailing the deaths of Emmett Till and George Lee and its effect on the civil
rights movement in Mississippi).
27. Id. at 101.
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the worst record of black voter registration in the South. In 1960, only about 5
percent of the adult black population in the state had managed to enroll.28
Even before the VEP came into existence, black activists from inside and
outside the Magnolia State struggled to crack the impenetrable wall of
disfranchisement erected to preserve white supremacy. Robert Parris Moses proved
the most important of those who ventured into Mississippi.2 9 Moses grew up in New
York City and earned a master's degree in philosophy from Harvard. In February
1960, Moses was teaching mathematics at Horace Mann, a prestigious private high
school in the Bronx, when the sit-ins to desegregate public accommodations in the
South began. Inspired by these protests, Moses went to work for SCLC in the
summer of 1960 in Atlanta. 3' There he met Ella Baker, who had held administrative
positions in both the NAACP and the SCLC 3' and was a major influence in the
formation of the SNCC. 32 Baker's ideas about the need of the civil rights movement
to organize local communities and develop indigenous leadership rather than
depend upon national leaders and mass demonstrations resonated with Moses.33
Moses traveled into the Mississippi Delta to recruit local leaders to a conference
that the SNCC was planning. In the small town of Cleveland, Mississippi, he met
Amzie Moore. Moore was a veteran of the black freedom struggle and had worked
with the NAACP and the Regional Council of Negro Leadership. Moore saw
students as the necessary force to rejuvenate the battered civil rights movement
within the state.34 Moore convinced Moses to return the following summer and
concentrate on voter registration. Moore did not see much benefit from protests
against segregated public accommodations because most blacks in the area were too
poor to take advantage of them. Rather, he emphasized the right to vote, which he
believed would provide the political power to achieve genuine equality.35
In 1961, after completing the final year of his teaching contract, Moses returned
to Mississippi as Moore suggested. Moore had not come up with the resources to
undertake a voter registration drive, but he did send Moses to McComb, Mississippi
in Pike County where blacks were ready to start a suffrage campaign. C. C. Bryant,
the president of the NAACP in McComb had kept his branch alive during the
1950s. 36 In mid-July, Moses began canvassing black neighborhoods with Webb
Owens, a retired railroad employee and NAACP leader. Through his contact with

28. GARROw, supra note 21, at 19, tbl.l-3; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 81, tbl.1.
29. For an in-depth discussion of Robert Parris Moses on the civil rights movement in
Mississippi, see ERIC BURNER, AND HE GENTLY SHALL.LEAD THEM: ROBERT PARRIS MOSES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS INMISSISSIPPI (1994).
30. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 102.
31. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 67.
32. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 102.
33. See BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT: A RADICAL
DEMOCRATIC VISION 251 (2003).
34. DITrMER, supra note 26, at 102-03.
35. Id. at 103.
36. Id.
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Bryant and Owens, Moses succeeded in gaining support from black business people
and ministers. 37 The Society Hill Baptist Church supplied the use of its mimeograph
machine and the Masonic Temple provided a room to conduct voter education
classes in which blacks learned how to fill out the complicated Mississippi voter
registration forms. 3 8 By this time, two additional SNCC workers, Reginald
Robinson and John Hardy, had joined Moses and they succeeded in registering a
handful of people and attracting more than two dozen to their classes.39
Word of their success in Pike County traveled to surrounding counties and
brought requests for SNCC to establish classes in those counties as well.4 ° Moses
went into neighboring Amite County and made contact with E. W. Steptoe, the
founder of the county NAACP chapter. Moses, who along with other SNCC
organizers was committed to non-violence, quickly discovered that rural blacks like
Steptoe stored guns in their houses to protect themselves against white harassment.4'
On August 15, Moses took three people into Liberty, the ironically named county
seat, to register. There, Moses was arrested for the first, but not the last, time. The
following week, one of the sheriff's cousins slammed the blunt end of a knife into
Moses's head, requiring him to receive eight stitches for his bloody wound.42
Although Moses brought criminal charges against his attacker, a bold move for a
black man to take against a white man in this repressive county, an all-white jury
acquitted his assailant.43 Nevertheless, through his courage and boldness, Moses
attracted other SNCC workers to join him in southwest Mississippi and inspired
local youths to venture into the movement. Two of them, Hollis Watkins and Curtis
Hayes, who lived just outside of McComb, organized a demonstration against
segregated facilities and were arrested. 44
With the upsurge of protest, segregationist violence accelerated. On September
7, John Hardy accompanied two black applicants to register to vote in neighboring
Tylertown in Walthall County. The registrar hit Hardy over the head with a gun,
warning him: "Stay out of here, you dumb son of a bitch."45 Adding insult to injury,
the sheriff, John Q. Wood, then arrested Hardy for disorderly conduct.46 A few
weeks later, on September 25, E. H. Hurst, a state legislator, shot and killed Herbert
Lee near Liberty.47 Lee belonged to the NAACP and worked with Moses on voter

37. Id. at 103-04.

38. Id. at 104.
39. Id. at 105.
40. DIr"MER, supra note 26, at 105.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 106.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 106-07.
45. Id. at 108.
46. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 108. The Civil Rights Division filed litigation that prevented the
state from bringing Hardy to trial. Id.
47. Id. at 109.
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registration.48 Hurst claimed that he got into a dispute with Lee over money and
that Lee attacked him first with a tire iron.49 When Hurst whipped out his gun to
protect himself, he claimed, it accidentally fired and killed Lee. A coroner's jury
backed up Hurst's version.50
In the face of this terror, the voter registration campaign fizzled.5 McComb's
black high school students continued to protest segregation through sit-ins and
marches, which led to arrests and expulsions from school.52 Bryant and other
community elders had only bargained for voter registration and not mass
demonstrations that would expose their children to danger. The man who invited
Moses into his community withdrew support for SNCC.5 3 The final blow came on
October 31, when Moses and several SNCC workers were convicted of disturbing
the peace and sent to jail for up to six months.54 From his cell in the town of
Magnolia, an undaunted Moses recorded his thoughts:
This is Mississippi, the middle of the iceberg. Hollis [Watkins] is
leading off with his tenor, 'Michael row the boat ashore, Alleluia;
Christian brothers don't be slow, Alleluia; Mississippi's next to
go, Alleluia.' This is a tremor in the middle of the iceberg, from
a stone that the builders rejected. 5
The following month, Moses and his comrades walked out of jail on bail money
provided by the Southern Conference Educational Fund,56 the successor to the
Southern Conference for Human Welfare.57 Having failed to crack the iceberg in
McComb, Moses and the activists nevertheless remained in Mississippi, continuing
to chip away at the glacier of white supremacy.
The creation of the Voter Education Project helped rejuvenate SNCC's voter
registration efforts in the state, most importantly in Greenwood. Located in the
Delta county of Leflore, where blacks comprised a majority of the population but
only 2 percent of the voters,58 Greenwood attracted Sam Block of SNCC in June
1962 to begin organizing around the right to vote. 59 The murder of Emmett Till in
1955 deeply affected Block, a native Mississippian, as it had many other young

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
DITTMER, supra note 26, at 109.
See id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
LAWSON, supra note 9, at 145.
DITTMER, supra note 26, at 128-29.
Id. at 128.
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people his age. 60 After a stint in the Air Force following high school and college,
the twenty-three-year-old returned home and joined SNCC.6' In August 1962,
Block journeyed to Greenwood alone and accompanied several local blacks to the
registrar's office. Subsequently, Block received warnings from the segregationist
white Citizens' Council, a more respectable version of the Ku Klux Klan, to refrain
from taking
other blacks to register. On August 13, three white men assaulted and
62
him.
beat
On the night of August 16, Block and two SNCC colleagues looked out of their
office window and saw a police car. Soon after the police car drove by, an
automobile pulled-up filled, with armed men. Eight men jumped out of the car,
entered the building, and climbed the stairs to the SNCC office on the second floor.
Barely a step ahead of them, Block and his co-workers climbed out of the bathroom
window and leaped from rooftop to rooftop until they evaded the assailants and took
refuge in the Greenwood home of a black supporter.63
SNCC forces refused to capitulate, and white supremacists responded with
more violence and intimidation. After Block made a statement, which was reported
in the local press, charging that opponents of the voter registration drive were
behind the terrorism, he was prosecuted and convicted for "public utterances
designed to incite breach of peace" and sentenced to six months in jail and a $500
fine.' On February 28, 1963 white terrorists struck directly at SNCC. While
meeting at the SNCC office with Randolph Blackwell, a VEP official from Atlanta,
SNCC worker Jimmy Travis spotted an automobile with no license plates parked
outside in the street. Smelling danger, the activists decided to leave the building
and disperse. 65 Along with Moses, Blackwell and Travis drove out of town along
Highway 82 toward Greenville. Seven miles down the road, the same menacing car
pulled alongside the SNCC vehicle and fired shots into the automobile. Travis, the
driver, took two bullets, one in the shoulder and one in the neck. Though the
wounds were serious, he survived.66

Rather than retreat, SNCC dug in even deeper. The group summoned its
workers from throughout Mississippi and concentrated them in Greenwood to
accelerate the voter registration drive. 67 The white reign of terror continued. On
March 6, snipers fired shots into a car parked in front SNCC headquarters, blowing
out some windows and slightly injuring workers inside with spraying glass.68 On
March 24, arsonists set fire to the SNCC office, inflicting heavy damage to its

60. Id. at 57.
61. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 84.
62. DITrMER, supra note 26, at 132.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. 132-33.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148.
68. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 150.
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contents.69 On March 27, James Forman, SNCC's executive secretary, 70 led a
procession to city hall to protest the violence. Police broke up the peaceful
demonstration by unleashing a snarling German shepherd against the marchers.
Ten SNCC leaders, including Moses and Forman, were arrested and jailed.7'
At this juncture, the demonstrations and violence attracted the attention of the
national media.72 Backed by the VEP, SNCC leaders called upon the federal
government to intervene and protect the rights of those who tried to register.73
Added pressure and added fear that the situation was spiraling out of control led the
Kennedy administration to file litigation against the City of Greenwood, asking for
a temporary restraining order against city officials and an order directing the release
of incarcerated civil rights activists. 74 Before the government's case received a
hearing, on April 3, 1963 the Department of Justice engineered a compromise.75
Criticized by Mississippi's two powerful United States Senators, James Eastland
and John Stennis, for filing unnecessary litigation and worried that angry blacks in
Greenwood would provoke white segregationists into increased violence, the
Department entered into an agreement with local officials.76 John Doar, the
Department attorney who was most sympathetic to the plight of civil rights
advocates, followed Department instructions to drop the lawsuit in exchange for the
release of the SNCC prisoners.77 Both the VEP and SNCC expressed bitter
disappointment with the government's failure to follow through with its pledge of
federal protection and denounced the agreement.78 As the national government
withdrew, so too did reporters for the national media, who flocked to Birmingham
to cover rapidly escalating, and thus considered more newsworthy, demonstrations
led by Dr. King.79

Though SNCC continued its voter registration campaign in Greenwood, its
efforts produced few tangible results. By mid-1963, some 1,300 blacks had braved
obstacles to make an attempt to pass the literacy test and register to vote without
success.8" With a great deal of reluctance, on November 12, 1963, the VEP decided
that it could no longer afford to fund projects in Mississippi." In reaching this
decision, the VEP's executive director, Wiley Branton, singled out the federal

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
LAWSON, supra note 2, at 85.
DITTMER, supra note 26, at 153.
Id. at 154-55.
Id.
Id. at
LAWSON, supra note 9, at 277; see DITIMER, supra note 26, at 155.
See WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 11, at 62.
LAWSON, supra note 2, at 86.
See Letter from Wilet A. Branton, Director, Voter Education Project, to Aaron Henry and

Robert Moses (November 12, 1963), in STEVEN F. LAWSON & CHARLES PAYNE, DEBATING THE CIVIL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1945-1968, at 83 (1998).
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government for its failure "to protect the people who have sought to register and
vote or who are working actively in getting others to register. '82 Fewer than 5,000
black Mississippians had managed to enroll, which broke down to an expenditure
by the VEP of $12.13 per voter.83 This expenditure was two and a half times as
high as the next most costly state, Louisiana, which cost $4.84 per voter.84
Bitterly disappointed, SNCC and its allies still did not give up in the Magnolia
state. Indeed, SNCC stepped up its efforts in a two-pronged strategy to publicize
the plight of Mississippi blacks: (1) bring the brutal reality of black
disfranchisement to national attention, and (2) continue organizing local
communities around the right to vote.8 ' Because of fierce resistance, civil rights
forces in the state united under the banner of the Council of Federated
Organizations (COFO) in 1962. Guided mainly by SNCC and CORE, COFO also
gathered the NAACP and SCLC under its umbrella.86 The NAACP furnished one
of its most tireless representatives in the state as COFO's president: Aaron Henry,
a drug store proprietor.87 In 1963, in the aftermath of the Greenwood campaign,
COFO decided to conduct a "mock election" to coincide with the regularly
scheduled gubernatorial contest in the fall. Toward this end, Henry ran a symbolic
campaign for governor. Because the overwhelming majority of blacks still could not
vote, the "Freedom Vote" campaign attempted to sign up African Americans and
have them cast unofficial ballots.88
The idea for the project developed out of discussions between Allard
Lowenstein and Bob Moses. 89 A graduate of the University of North Carolina and
Yale Law School, Lowenstein served as a dean at Stanford University. Lowenstein
had close connections to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and had spoken
out against apartheid in South Africa.9" Lowenstein envisioned that newly
enfranchised Mississippi blacks, as well as those throughout the South, would help
reshape the Democrats in a more liberal direction by using their clout to topple
southern conservatives like Senators Eastland and Stennis.9 Moses did not have
the fortunes of the Democratic Party uppermost in his mind. Rather, he saw the
simulated election campaign primarily as a means of organizing blacks and

82. Id. at 84.
83. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 294, tbl.2.
84. Id. In South Carolina the cost was $1.96, with $94,489 spent to register 48,099 voters. The
average cost was $2.55 per voter. Id.
85. See LAWSON, supra note 2, at 87.
86. Id.
87. Dri-rMER, supra note 26, at 120; LAWSON, supra note 9, at 265.
88. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 87; see generally AARON HENRY & CONSTANCE CURRY, AARON

HENRY: THE FIRE EVER BURNING 156-61 (2000) (detailing the role of Aaron Henry in the "Freedom
Vote" campaign).
89. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 200.
90. See generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, NEVER STOP RUNNING: ALLARD LOWENSTEIN AND THE

STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1993) (detailing the life of Allard Lowenstein).
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providing an independent electoral base to obtain their political goals.92
Nevertheless, both agreed that Lowenstein should use his influence on northern
campuses to recruit white student volunteers to spend the fall in Mississippi and
help with the campaign. Although not everyone in SNCC supported the idea of
importing white students into the campaign, the students would provide increased
personnel and would also highlight for a national audience the undemocratic and
brutal conditions blacks faced.93 Moses prevailed in his belief that blacks would
have to pry support from the federal government before they could vote.
On October 6, 1963, COFO launched the campaign at its statewide convention
at the Masonic Temple in Jackson.94 The delegates adopted a platform that
endorsed "racial justice, school desegregation, and the right to vote." 95 With respect
to the right to vote, COFO argued that Mississippi should not be entitled to
administer a literacy test. 96 The convention nominated Aaron Henry to run for
governor. 97 Running with him for lieutenant governor was Ed King, a white
chaplain at Tougaloo College.98
As expected, segregationists harassed the candidates and their campaign
workers. Police in Indianola arrested civil rights workers for distributing leaflets
without a permit. In Clarksdale, Lowenstein went to jail for violating the town's
curfew ordinance.99 Student volunteers and veterans alike spent time in jail for
allegedly disobeying traffic ordinances.' 00 In a few cases, "white hoodlums" shot
at campaign workers and chased them out of town.'°
The mock election succeeded in proving the importance of the suffrage for
black Mississippians. The approximately 80,000 blacks who cast their ballots,
nearly four times the number of those actually registered in Mississippi, vividly
demonstrated that disfranchised African Americans desperately wanted to vote and
participate as first-class citizens in the electoral process. Nearly all of them
supported Henry for Governor. 2 A breakdown of the results shows that SNCC and
CORE, which operated projects mainly in the rural delta, produced less than onefifth of the total of groups situated elsewhere.0 3 For example, in Leflore County
only 2,000 turned out for the election." The NAACP signed up the largest number
of blacks, which were mainly in Jackson-the state capital and the most urban area

92. See id at 200-01.
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 202.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 203.
100. Id. at 203.
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in Mississippi. 1°5 Rather than an indication of apathy on the part of rural black
Mississippians, the lean participation in the Delta indicated that well-justified fear
continued to keep the 06
disfranchised from voting in the most hardcore segregationist
sections of the state. 1
Finally, the Freedom Vote continued the legacy of African American political
participation outside of formal electoral politics. Whenever blacks had the chance
to make their voices heard, whether in church meetings, fraternal organizations, or
labor unions, they enthusiastically did so. Indeed, African Americans had forcefully
voiced their political opinions in protest marches, boycotts, and testimony before
Congress.'0 7 In the decades before formally obtaining the right to vote through the
Nineteenth Amendment, black women played an active role by vocalizing their
views in church and women's club gatherings and in encouraging black men to
vote.' The large turnout in the Freedom Vote amply demonstrated that the flame
of black political involvement had not been extinguished in what the Mississippi
historian James W. Silver termed the most "closed society" in the United States."0 9
With momentum building, Mississippi became the focus of the civil rights
movement's efforts to spotlight black disfranchisement and pressure Washington
into providing relief. Shortly after the completion of the mock election in the
0 The group
Mississippi, COFO staff met in Greenville to discuss future plans.°"
agreed to launch a concerted voter drive the following summer, directed by Bob
Moses and Dave Dennis of CORE, which would build upon COFO's recent
freedom ballot operation."' In preparing for the 1964 "Freedom Summer
campaign," the main source of contention revolved around the issue whether whites
should play a role in this campaign similar to the one they had played in the mock
election conducted the year before." 2 Most of those in attendance believed that
whites should not serve in any leadership capacity, should be closely supervised by
SNCC and CORE staff, and should work mainly in white communities." 3 The
issue of race became more salient in light of black perceptions that Lowenstein's
recruits could not help but act paternalistically toward blacks with a markedly
different class and social backgrounds from themselves.' Some of the staff also

105. Id. at 204-06.

106. Id.;

LAWSON, supra note 2, at 87.
107. In 1946, black World War H veterans in Mississippi played a leading role in testifying
before a congressional committee holding hearings in Jackson regarding charges that Senator Theodore
Bilbo behaved improperly by discouraging black Mississippians from voting. DIITMER, supra note 26,
at 8-9.; LAWSON, supra note 9, 107-09; DiITMER, supra note 26, at 3-8. In January 1947, the Senate
refused to seat him before having a full investigation; however, the issue became moot when Bilbo died
of cancer that August. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 113- 14.
108. See DIITrMER, supra note 26, at 127.
109. JAMES W. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SOCIETY 6 (1966).

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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believed that placing whites in leadership positions would reinforce the
subservience local blacks felt in the presence of whites." 5
Moses disagreed for philosophical and tactical reasons. To limit white
participation was a racist position, and he argued, "That's what we're fighting
[against.]" ' 1 6 Also, Moses had not given up on the idea that bringing northern
whites into Mississippi would convince the federal government to follow." 7 He
candidly admitted that while the nation did not respond to black deaths in the state,
its leaders would heed the violence facing hundreds of white college students,
including the possibility of murder." 8 Moses, a reader of Albert Camus and other
existentialist philosophers, took personal responsibility very seriously and dreaded
the lives that would be lost as a result of his actions." 9 However, he was not the
source of the violence in Mississippi, and he wanted to show those living outside
the state the terror that blacks experienced every day. 120 His arguments prevailed.
Before Freedom Summer began, COFO continued its efforts to register blacks
in a number of key areas in Mississippi. COFO declared January 22, 1964, as
"Freedom Day" in Hattiesburg."'2 The Justice Department had won an injunction
that prevented Theron Lynd from engaging in discriminatory voter registration
practices. 2 2 As the registrar of Forrest County, where Hattiesburg was the county
seat, Lynd had long been involved in preventing African Americans from passing
the state literacy test. 123 With this boost from the judiciary, COFO mobilized a few
hundred people to line up en masse at the Forrest County Courthouse and apply to
register. 124 COFO also organized a picket line at the courthouse to protest
discriminatory treatment. 21 Under the watchful eyes of national reporters
summoned by COFO, the local police did not use physical force to break up the
demonstration, an unprecedented event in the county.126 More than 150 people took
the test in a generally peaceful atmosphere.127 The drive encouraged COFO and the
local residents to continue organizing. 28 The police waited until the national media29
departed before making arrests, but they did not stop further attempts to register. 1
Civil rights activists in the town of Canton in Madison County copied Freedom
Day after witnessing the events in Hattiesburg. CORE set up a base in Canton and

115. Id. at 209.
116. DrTrMER, supra note 26, at 209.
117. Id. at 209-10.
118. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 94.
119. RANSBY, supra note 33, at 248.
120. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 94.
121. DITTMER, supra note 26, at 219.
122. Id. at 220; see United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818, 823 (1962).
123. Lynd, 301 F.2d at 821-22.
124. DITrMER, supra note 26, at 220.
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recruited C. 0. Chinn, a local businessman to work with the group to rally blacks
behind the movement.130 Foote Campbell of Madison County, like Theron Lynd,
kept a tight grip on the voting books, which contained the names of 97 percent of
adult whites, but only 1.2 percent of eligible blacks.' SNCC and NAACP staff
joined those from CORE and recruited approximately 350 blacks at the
courthouse. 3 2 Only five people were allowed to take the test, and the Justice
Department filed suit against Foote for discrimination the following week.'33 The
case went to Judge Cox, a judicial obstructionist, who publicly referred to blacks
in court as "chimpanzees."' 34 Nevertheless, Cox, who had previous decisions
reversed by higher courts, ordered that Campbell handle at least fifty applications
135
a day.
Buoyed by demonstrations in Hattiesburg and Canton, blacks in Greenwood set
their own Freedom Day for March 25.136 The situation in Greenwood was less
peaceful. The day before the rally, the police arrested SNCC's Willie Peacock and
three others for distributing flyers, and the Ku Klux Klan burned a cross in front of
SNCC headquarters.' 37 After gathering at the Elks Hall, some two hundred blacks
went to the courthouse to register; another one hundred people, including a few
white clergymen, joined a picket line to protest racial bias. 138 About three dozen
blacks were permitted to take the voting test. 3 9 The various freedom days stirred
blacks in Mississippi to attempt to register, but few managed to do so in the face
of solid opposition. 40
Against this background, the organizers of Freedom Summer began their
campaign. After setting up a recruiting process and carefully screening applicants,
in mid-June COFO convened a two week orientation session at the Western College
for Women in Oxford, Ohio, to prepare volunteers for the challenges and dangers
that awaited them in Mississippi.'
The volunteers, mainly white children of
privilege, listened to somber recitations by civil rights veterans, including project
director Bob Moses, about life in Mississippi, which for blacks resembled a thirdworld economy and a totalitarian state. 142 Through role playing, volunteers received
training in how to nonviolently respond to the abuse they would receive from the
opposition. 143 They prepared to face grave difficulties and knew their lives would
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Id.
Id. at 222-23.
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Id. at 242-44.
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be in jeopardy. Jimmy Travis, who had been shot outside Greenwood the year
before, warned, "It's hell in Mississippi. And you're [sic] got to realize that nobody
cares. I'm black. You're white. If you're going down there, you're going to be
treated worse than black.' 44Because you are supposed to be free. But I say no one
is free until everyone is.'
Travis's lesson hit home quickly, even before most of the volunteers had left
for Mississippi. On June 21, 1964, a week after the Oxford orientations began,
three COFO staff members in Mississippi disappeared.145 Michael Schwerner and
James Cheney, who worked for CORE, and Andrew Goodman, one of the summer
volunteers from Queens, New York, had gone to investigate the torching of the
146
Mount Zion Methodist Church in Longdale, near Meridian in Neshoba County.
Shortly after they finished investigating the ruins, Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price
arrested them on a traffic charge and placed them in jail in the town of
Philadelphia. 147 Later that evening, Price released them and they headed back to
Meridian by car. Under cover of darkness, Deputy Sheriff Price again stopped the
group on their way to Meridian and turned them over to members of the Ku Klux
Klan, who murdered them, burned their car, and buried their bodies under a remote
earthen dam. 148 Their remains were not discovered until August 4; by then COFO
was sure that they had been murdered.'49

Until this incident the federal government declined to become involved in
safeguarding Freedom Summer workers. Although many parents of volunteers,
along with civil rights organizations, urged Washington to take steps to protect
voting rights crusaders, the President and his advisors had demurred. 50 Lyndon B.
Johnson succeeded John F. Kennedy after his assassination the previous
November.' 5' Although more sympathetic to civil rights than Kennedy had been,
like his predecessor, Johnson believed that federal force should be deployed
sparingly in the internal affairs of states. Law enforcement was a matter for local
officials to undertake. 2 Four days before the three civil rights workers disappeared,
a White House aide rejected a request from parents of the volunteers for federal
protection "before a tragic incident takes place."' 53 Lee White found it "incredible

144. NicOtAUs MILLS, LIKE A HOLY CRUSADE: MISSISSIPPI 1964-THE TURNING OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 92 (1992).
145. See DITTMER, supra note 26, at 247-48.
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AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MISSISSIPPI 1

(1988).
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that those people who are voluntarily sticking their head into the lion's mouth
would ask for somebody to come down and shoot the lion."' 54
The disappearance of Cheney, Schwerner, and Goodman, which generated
national and international publicity, forced the federal government to act. 5'
Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate the matter, and the Bureau set up an office
in Mississippi to do so.' 56 Previously, the FBI had compiled a poor record in
dealing with civil rights issues. In fact, Hoover had a dim view of the capacity of
blacks to handle equality, and he also initiated a clandestine operation to spy on and
smear Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.. 157 However, under the President's orders and
with the Bureau's professional reputation on the line, Hoover's agents conducted
a successful probe that led to the apprehension of the killers, including a deputy
sheriff. 5' 8
However, the federal government did not change its position about refusing to
provide protection, and throughout the summer, violence continued to flare. In
Leake County, the tiny town of Harmony-an ironic name in light of the state's
racial inferno-came under assault for its civil rights activities. 5 9 Like many
women in other towns throughout the South, two sisters, Winson and Dovie
Hudson, led the movement in this community. 60 They collaborated with CORE
workers to set up a "Freedom School" in Harmony. A critical aspect of Freedom
Summer, these schools provided an education for black youths and gave them an
opportunity to learn the academic skills missing from their limited and impoverished
segregated education.' 6' The schools also instilled a sense of pride in learning about
African American heritage and prepared the students to exercise their rights as firstclass citizens. 162 However, terrorists aimed to stop this education and began
planting bombs in black residents' mailboxes. 163 When a carload of whites drove
up to Dovie Hudson's mailbox, she had her sons on alert and armed with guns.
They riddled the approaching vehicle with bullets, fending off the assault."6 This
incident demonstrated that local blacks would use force65 to defend themselves,
despite the movement's tactical support of nonviolence.
The freedom campaign in McComb, where three years earlier Bob Moses had
started his quest to organize blacks for the right to vote, once again became the
154. Id.
155. MILLS, supra note 144, at 23.

156. Id.
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target of Klan violence and segregationist harassment.' 66 A bomb rocked C.C.
Bryant's house along with two others the day after the killing outside of
Philadelphia.'67 COFO operated a freedom house owned by Mrs. Willie Mae
Cotton on Wall Street.168 Bombers blasted the house, knocking down one of the
walls and injuring the project director, Curtis Hayes, and a white volunteer. 169 The
reign of terror continued through June and July as the Klan torched three churches
in adjacent Pike and Amite Counties. 7 0 In early August, black business leaders
gathered at Aylene Quinn's caf6, which served as a haven for beleaguered COFO
staff. 7' They agreed to support the local movement and began holding meetings
at St. Paul's Methodist Church. 7 2 The effort to register blacks
continued, despite
17 3
further intimidations and bombings-six over two months.
In addition to voter registration campaigns and freedom schools, the summer
project assisted in establishing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
(MFDP).'7 4 Freedom workers established the MFDP to protest the exclusion of
blacks from the regular state Democratic Party and its procedure for choosing
delegates to attend the Democratic National Convention.' 75 The MFDP erected a
parallel structure open to blacks as well as white Mississippians. 7 6 Like the regular
party, the group held precinct, county, and state conventions to select
representatives to attend the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, New
Jersey. 77
To prove its case, the MFDP had to show that blacks were systematically barred
from the official deliberations of the state Democratic Party. 78 To demonstrate
such discrimination, black Mississippians tried to participate in the nearly 1,900
precinct meetings the regular Democrats held throughout the state. 79 Very few
blacks gained entry either at the precinct or county levels." 0 No blacks attended the
state convention, and the delegation chosen as a result of this process was lilywhite.' 8' In addition, most of the white delegates did not support Lyndon Johnson
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intended to vote for
or the views of the national Democratic Party-reportedly they
82
Goldwater.1
Barry
candidate,
Republican
the conservative
In late July, the MFDP began to convene its precinct meetings, and on August
6, some 2,500 delegates gathered at the state party convention at the Masonic
Temple in Jackson.1 3 Baker, the godmother of SNCC, believed in community
organizing and had faith in the power of local people to choose their own leaders.'84
At the Masonic Temple she urged blacks to educate themselves about their
citizenship rights and to be vigilant about electing people who "feel their sense of
importance and will represent themselves before they represent you."' 8 5 This
reference revealed that Baker was already thinking beyond obtaining the franchise
and looking to the need to choose representatives who would advance the
liberationist goals of the black freedom struggle. She especially had in mind the
economic objective of equal opportunity and a decent standard of living.
The sixty-eight member MFDP delegation, which included four whites,
journeyed to the convention feeling positive about its chances of replacing the
regulars. 8 6 The group stayed at the Gem Motel, about a mile from the convention
center. 87 Its members did not know that President Johnson was monitoring their
conversations. The FBI had undertaken extensive surveillance, including wiretaps
and the use of informers, to keep track of the MFDP's moves. 188 The President did
not want the MFDP to provoke an all-out credentials fight that would threaten his
white southern support.' 89
The MFDP's lawyer, Joseph Rauh, a veteran liberal attorney and counsel to the
United Auto Workers, outlined a strategy that gave the Freedom Democrats two
chances of gaining recognition.' 9" First, they would present their case to the
Credentials Committee, where they had to convince only eleven of the 108
representatives to send their challenge to the floor of the convention. 9' Once there,
the MFDP needed the support ofjust eight state delegations to force a roll call vote
on the question of their seating. 92 Second, if they managed to get this far, the
challengers believed that with the media televising the proceedings throughout the
nation, they could line up enough delegations on their side and win their case.
Indeed, the MFDP already counted California, Michigan, and New York in its
colulnn.'93
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On August 22, the Credentials Committee heard testimony from both sides in
the dispute.' 94 The regulars argued that they had duly chosen convention delegates
according to longstanding Democratic Party rules.' 95 The challengers asserted that
the regular Democrats had barred blacks from participating in their selection
process.196 The most riveting evidence came from a leading member of the MFDP
delegation, Fannie Lou Hamer, who was from Sunflower County, the home of
Senator Eastland. In 1962, after attempting to register to vote, Hamer lost her job
as timekeeper and her home on a plantation because she had attempted to register
to vote.' 97 She became a staff member of SNCC and an inspiration to the young

women and men who took part in COFO organizing. With television cameras
recording her testimony, Hamer painted a graphic and painful picture of how
Mississippi treated blacks who sought first class citizenship.' 98 Hamer recounted
an arrest, humiliating interrogation, and beating that she and five others experienced
in the Winona, Mississippi jail.' Given the indignities that blacks suffered merely
trying to register to vote, Hamer looked at the committee members and the
television audience that attentively watched the proceedings and asserted, "If the
Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America... ,200 "[I]s this
America," she asked, "the land of the free and the home of the brave where we have
to sleep with our telephones off the hooks because our lives be threatened daily
because we want to live as decent human beings, in America?"' '
Hamer's emotional account appeared to hit the mark, galvanizing President
Johnson into action.20 2 Johnson feared that the battle over Mississippi would tear
the convention apart and, if the MFDP won its challenge, provoke a walkout by
white southern delegations reminiscent of the scene at the 1948 Democratic
National Convention. To reassert control over the deliberations, Johnson called an
impromptu press conference while Hamer was speaking to preempt live coverage
before the national television audience. 2 3 The President achieved only temporary
success because television cameras continued to record her testimony while Johnson
held his conference, and the networks replayed Hamer's testimony on their evening
news broadcasts. 2 4
The President did not intend to be outmaneuvered. Seeking to confine the fight
to the Credentials Committee and keep the matter from reaching the convention
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floor, he orchestrated a compromise. Johnson informed the liberals on the
committee that if they wanted him to select Hubert Humphrey as his running mate,
they had to find a way to broker a deal. °5 Humphrey supporters Walter Mondale
of Minnesota and Walter Reuther, the head of the United Automobile Workers,
operated behind the scenes to convince the delegates to seat the Mississippi regulars
in exchange for swearing their allegiance to the national Democratic Party and
extending two at-large seats to the MFDP, leaving nearly all the freedom delegates
excluded from participation." 6 With Johnson's approval, the agreement named
Aaron Henry and Ed King as the two delegates; the President deliberately wanted
to keep the spellbinding Mrs. Hamer from gaining formal recognition. 207 This
solution pleased neither side. Most of the Mississippi regulars walked out, refusing
to take the loyalty oath.20 8 At the same time, after a series of caucuses at the Union
Temple Baptist Church, the MFDP members rejected the "back of the bus
bargain."20 9 In her powerful voice, Hamer declared, "We didn't come all this way
for no two seats. '210 Yet, the MFDP did not go away empty handed. The
convention voted to establish a committee to draw up guidelines to eliminate racial
discrimination in delegate selection for all succeeding national conventions.1
Indeed, Hamer would take a seat at the 1968 convention in a delegation of thirty-six
blacks and thirty-two whites.21 2 Nor did the MFDP give up. As an outgrowth of the
summer project, the party nominated candidates to run for Congress. Besides
Hamer, Annie Devine and Victoria Gray competed for seats in the House of
Representatives. 2 3 The three underscored the importance of local women to the
movement. 2 " Devine, a mother of four, a pillar of her church, and a schoolteacher,
emerged as a leader after organizing drives in Canton. 21 5' A resident of Hattiesburg,
Gray was also a wife and mother, though she came from a business background
prior to working with COFO 2 16 Unlike the situation at the Democratic National
Convention, the three candidates had weak legal positions and little political support
to win seats in Congress. 217 At best, they may have hoped to block the seating of
the regularly elected white congressmen, which had occurred with Theodore Bilbo
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in 1947.218 However, when the new Session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress opened
in January 1965, the House overwhelmingly rejected their attempt.2 19
Despite tangible progress resulting from the suffrage crusade, most southern
blacks in 1964 still could not vote. In the South, approximately 57 percent of
eligible African Americans remained unregistered. 22' The situation remained the
worst in Alabama and Mississippi, where respectively 23 percent and 6.7 percent
of blacks could vote.22 1 With Mississippi already inundated with suffrage
campaigns, in January 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC moved into
Selma, Alabama, to highlight the obstacles blacks faced in seeking to register.222
King's efforts depended on generating national publicity to prompt federal action.
King's presence attracted the customary national press coverage, which had been
missing from earlier drives conducted by SNCC in Selma.223
King entered territory that SNCC had already explored. In 1963, SNCC
experienced mixed success when it sent field workers to Selma to organize local
blacks.224 On October 7, 1963, the group held a Freedom Day, which mobilized
some three-hundred blacks seeking to register to line up at the courthouse. 225 They
were instead greeted by Sheriff Jim Clark's police force, which arrested
demonstrators and treated them roughly while nearby Department of Justice
employees characteristically watched the harassment without intervening.226 The
SNCC's efforts did not produce many black voters, but they did facilitate the
creation of the Dallas County Voters League, which continued the struggle. 227 The
Reverend Frederick Reese, a high school teacher and Baptist clergyman, headed the
association. 228 Assisting him was Amelia P. Boynton, an independent
businesswoman who, along with her husband Samuel, operated an employment and
insurance agency.2 29 They permitted SNCC to use their office on Franklin Street
and opened up their home to civil rights organizers as a place to stay.230 Also, the
First Baptist Church in Selma provided space for the Voters League and the SNCC
to conduct meetings and voter registration classes. 23' Although the Voters League
sparred with local officials to enroll blacks, by 1965 fewer than four-hundred
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African Americans had signed up to vote in Dallas County, where Selma was
located. 32
Faced with the unwavering hostility of local authorities and the unwillingness
of the federal government to offer protection, the Voters League invited King to
launch a registration campaign in Selma. 33 Fresh from winning the Nobel Peace
Prize, King agreed. On January 2, 1965, the SCLC chief addressed a mass meeting
at Brown's Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church, which became the center
of the Selma Movement.2 34 Doubtful that he would receive any better treatment
from local officials than his predecessors, the Nobel Laureate expressed his real
objective in staging protests in Selma: "[W]e will seek to arouse the 235
federal
government by marching by the thousands [to] the places of registration.
Across from Brown's Chapel, residents of the George Washington Carver
Homes, a two-story apartment project built for black Selmans in 1951, assisted the
movement. They put up civil rights volunteers from outside the city and joined in
protests and meetings at the nearby church. 36 The SCLC used the surrounding area
between the
church and Carver buildings "as a training ground for nonviolent
23 7
protests.
King's presence attracted national press coverage, which had been missing
from earlier drives. Selma had a public safety director, Wilson Baker, who believed
that the best way to defuse the publicity King generated was to have law
enforcement act with restraint.238 When King and the SCLC launched their
campaign on January 18, Baker maintained a peaceful police presence. 239 This was
not the case with the deputy sheriffs under the command of Jim Clark. On January
19, Sheriff Clark's men halted a march to the Dallas County Courthouse, and Clark
accosted Mrs. Boynton, treated her roughly, and arrested her.2 40 Boynton's arrest
spurred other blacks to protest-most dramatically the town's teachers who, except
for Reese, had previously 2refrained
from bold action. 2 41 Each attempt to register,
42
fruitless.
proved
however,
Despite passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawing segregation in public
accommodations, hotels in Selma remained segregated. 243 The Torch Motel,

232. GARROW, supra note 21, at 34; LAWSON, supra note 2, at 105.
233. GARROW, supra note 21, at 39.
234. Id.; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-I1965,255

(1987).
235. WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 258.
236. DAVIS, supra note 230, at 105.
237. Id.
238. GARROW, supra note 21, at 40.
239. Id. at 42.
240. Id. at 43.
241. Id. at 44.
242. See WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 259-61.
243. The 1964 Act also contains a provision relating to voter registration. LAWSON, supra note
2, at 95. It stipulates that, for the purpose of judging literacy as a voting qualification, proof of a sixth
grade education should be considered sufficient. Id. The statute still left implementation in the hands
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located at 1802 Vine Street, was one of two facilities that served blacks, and King
and his SCLC lieutenants took shelter in its five dollar per day rooms. 2" Annie
Cooper, a fifty-three year old nurse who had been fired from her previous job at the
Dunn Rest Home for engaging in voter registration activities, managed the
facility.245 During attempts to register voters in January, Mrs. Cooper and Sheriff
Clark got into a fist fight at the county courthouse, when the sheriff pushed her
while she stood in line.246 Despite the strictures of nonviolent protest, Cooper
punched him in the face several times. 247 As deputies grabbed her, she brazenly
yelled at Clark, "I wish you would hit me, you scum. ' 248 Clark then whacked
Cooper over the head with his club, an image that photographers captured for the
national media.249

With the demonstrators' efforts stalemated, on February 1, King stepped up the
campaign. After rallying demonstrators at Brown's Chapel, he led a march to the
courthouse. 2 "° Baker, not Clark, arrested King before he arrived at the
courthouse.5 1 However, the result was the same, and King went to jail.252 From his
cell, he penned a "Letter from a Selma Jail," in which he sarcastically wrote: "This
is Selma, Alabama, where there are more Negroes in jail with me than there are on
the voting rolls. '2 3 His incarceration prompted further marches and arrests,
including the march of nearly five-hundred schoolchildren.254 With the jails
overflowing and the national press recording the arrests, the demonstrations
attracted national attention. 5 A delegation of fifteen congressmen traveled to
Selma to see the situation firsthand, and on February 4, black nationalist Malcolm
X spoke at Brown's Chapel and warned that "white people should thank Dr. King
for holding people in check, for there are other [black leaders] who do not believe
in these [nonviolent] measures. 256 While local whites did not appreciate the
implications of Malcolm X's remarks, President Johnson did. The same day, the

of the judiciary, which had proven to be a cumbersome and time-consuming method in the past. Id.
Furthermore, the law basically retained the use of literacy tests as an objective standard for registering,
thereby perpetuating the disenfranchisement of a large number of blacks who had been deprived of
adequate education. Id. At the same time, a large number of whites who could not read and did not
possess a sixth-grade education remained on the rolls because registrars had given them preferential
treatment. Id.
244. Davis, supra note 230, at 113-14.
245. Id.
246. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 381 (1986).
247. Id.
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President informed the nation that he intended to assure that the right to vote was
secured for black Alabamians. 25 7 Johnson meant to keep his word.
Following additional confrontations with Sheriff Clark's troops, on February
18, SCLC leaders led by the Reverend C.T. Vivian, conducted a night march in the
town of Marion in neighboring Perry County, where blacks were similarly without
the franchise. 258 The protest resulted in state troopers killing Jimmie Lee Jackson
and indiscriminately beating protesters and news reporters.259 With national
sympathy building, the SCLC came up with a dramatic way of highlighting the
plight of Alabama blacks. The group proposed a march from Selma to the state
capitol in Montgomery, a distance of fifty miles, to memorialize Jackson's death
and voice black grievances at the doorstep of Governor George C. Wallace, the
segregationist firebrand.26 ° On Sunday, March 7, 1964, demonstrators gathered at
Brown's Chapel before undertaking the dangerous joumey along Route 80. Wallace
had already denounced the demonstration and threatened to block it as a public
safety hazard. 261' Led by the SCLC's Hosea Williams and SNCC's John Lewis
(King was out of town tending his church duties in Atlanta), six-hundred people
marched two abreast to the Edmund Pettus Bridge, which crossed the Alabama
River and led out of town. 262 As the marchers reached the crest of the bridge, they
encountered Wallace's state troopers and Clark's deputies, who ordered the
marchers to turn back.263 Before they had a chance to comply, the combined police
forces-some on horseback-charged into their ranks, fired tear gas, routed the
protesters, and sent them sprawling to get back to Selma and the confines of
Brown's church.2 6
The brutality on the bridge whet Clark's and his deputies' appetite for more.
About 150 policemen chased the fleeing demonstrators, many of whom were
wounded and choking from tear gas, back to the church sanctuary.265 Enraged
residents of the Carver homes abandoned the nonviolent philosophy and hurled
bricks and bottles at the troopers.266 An injured John Lewis, who was severely
beaten at the bridge and carried back to Brown's, recalled the havoc caused by the
police outside the church, "I was inside the church, which was awash with sounds
of groaning and weeping. And singing and crying. Mothers shouting out for their
children. Children screaming for their mothers and brothers and sisters. So much

257. Id. at 262.
258. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 104; WILLAMS, supra note 234, at 265.
259. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 104.
260. Id.; WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 267.
261. WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 267-68
262. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 107-08; WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 269.
263. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 107-08; WtLLIAMS, supra note 234, at 269.
264. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 107-08; WILLIAMS, supra note 234, at 269.
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329 (1998).
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confusion and fear and anger all erupting at the same time. '267 Volunteer nurses
and doctors treated the wounded in Brown's Parsonage next door, which according
to Lewis "looked like a MASH [Mobile Army Surgical Hospital] unit. ' 268 They
treated victims for cuts, bruises, and tear gas burns. 269 Ambulances dispatched from
black funeral homes transported some of the more seriously wounded to Good
Samaritan Hospital. 270 Established by white Catholics and staffed mainly by black
medical personnel, this facility was the largest serving African Americans. 27 ' With
more than ninety people needing treatment and examining rooms overflowing, some
patients were taken to the smaller Birwell Infirmary.272

Network news cameras recorded the events of "Bloody Sunday," and the
American Broadcasting Company interrupted its evening broadcast of "Judgment
at Nuremberg" with coverage of the events in Selma, providing a vividjuxtaposition
of racial crimes in Nazi Germany and white supremacist Alabama.273 King and the
SCLC immediately planned to resume a second march from Selma to Montgomery
on March 9.274 However, Judge Frank M. Johnson issued a temporary injunction
that halted the march pending an appeal. 275 King chose to proceed anyway, and on
Tuesday, along with 2,000 marchers, he headed across the Edmund Pettus
Bridge.276 Once again, the group encountered state troopers, but this time they
avoided violence when King decided to turn around. 77 Behind the scenes, the
federal government had brokered a compromise with King that allowed marchers
time to kneel in prayer and to keep the state police from attacking. 78 Nevertheless,
on the evening of "Turnaround Tuesday," two white Unitarian ministers who had
journeyed to Selma to participate in the march were attacked by white thugs on the
streets of Selma. 9 One of them, the Reverend James Reeb, died from the
beating. 280 The list of martyrs now numbered two.
The nation's response to Reeb's murder evoked bittersweet feelings among
civil rights activists. Once again, political leaders appeared to respond more
vigorously to the death of a white than the deaths of blacks. 28' Following Jimmie
Lee Jackson's death earlier in the campaign, despite television and newspaper
coverage, neither the President nor Congress stirred into action. However, Reeb's
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murder prompted President Johnson to place a personal telephone call of sympathy
to the slain minister's wife and father.2" 2 In addition, nearly a score of congressmen
spoke out on the House and Senate floors demanding swift consideration of voting
rights legislation.2"' Among civil rights workers, the belief that the nation viewed
white lives as more valuable than black lives mitigated the satisfaction of seeing the
federal government respond favorably.284
In the meantime, protests in Alabama reached a climax. After holding hearings,
Judge Johnson lifted the ban on the Selma to Montgomery march.8 5 When Wallace
declined to furnish state protection, President Johnson federalized the Alabama
National Guard and dispatched Army troops, FBI agents, and federal marshals to
provide security.286 On Sunday, March 21, 4,000 blacks and whites from all over
the country, the largest crowd to date, assembled at Brown's Chapel to begin the
pilgrimage to Montgomery.287 With King and other civil rights notables up front,
the marchers tramped along the Jefferson Davis Highway, Route 80, with their way
clear.28 For four nights, marchers camped along the route. 289 The final evening
before heading into Montgomery, a huge throng gathered at the unincorporated City
of St. Jude, a Catholic complex that had provided housing, medical facilities, and
education for black residents of western Montgomery since 1938.290 In what
Townsend Davis called the "Movement's Woodstock," thousands crowded into a
muddy field for an evening concert to hear Sammy Davis, Jr., Harry Belafonte, Joan
Baez, and James Baldwin.2 9'
The next day, approximately 25,000 people joined in the protest as it reached
the state capitol, which had the Confederate flag waving in the breeze and Governor
Wallace inside the building. 292 Television cameras recorded the triumphant
procession, and the audience heard King deliver a typically stirring address.293
Acknowledging that the black pilgrimage to freedom was not yet over, the minister
pledged: "We are still in for a season of suffering. However difficult the moment,
however frustrating the hour, it will not be long, because truth crushed to earth will
rise again."29' King's words proved prophetic. The day of the march's culmination,
a carload of Klansmen near Lowndesboro shot into a car driven by Viola Liuzzo,
a white volunteer from Detroit, as she was riding with Leroy Moton, a black SCLC
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volunteer, to Montgomery after shuttling marchers back to Selma. 295

As the

automobile carrying the civil rights workers careened off the road, Mrs. Liuzzo lay
dead. Moton survived the attack and the crash, but he feigned death until the killers
roared off in their automobile.296 The number of martyrs had grown to three.
Events in Selma accelerated the timetable for voting rights legislation.
Following his election in 1964, the President made some preparations for
introducing a suffrage plan to combat the remaining obstacles to voting. 297 The

bloody conflict in Selma did not cause the President to initiate legislation, but did
shape the outline of the proposal and guaranteed the Johnson White House and its

congressional allies would fight for it vigorously. 29 8 About the same time as King
took charge of the Selma demonstrations, Johnson promised in his state of the union
address to "eliminate every remaining obstacle to the right and opportunity to
vote. 299

Originally, Johnson preferred not to press for new legislation in 1965 in order
to allow the federal government to implement the provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 300 Nevertheless, Johnson, a crafty legislative wizard, had the
Department of Justice design several legislative options. 0 1 Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, who had replaced Robert Kennedy, produced three such

options: a constitutional amendment providing for universal suffrage; a bill creating
a national commission to supervise registration in federal elections; and a proposal
to authorize a federal agency to conduct registration in state and federal elections
in areas where the proportion of registered blacks was low. 30 2 At this early stage,
Katzenbach preferred either the first or second suggestion. °3

295. MARY STANTON, FROM SELMA TO SORROW: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF VIOLA LIUZZo passim
(1998).
296. Id.; DAVIS, supra note 230, at 119-20. Before the end of the year, the Selma campaign
incurred one more death. Following the march to Montgomery, a white Unitarian minister, Jon Daniels,
headed to neighboring Lowndes County to organize black voter registrants. DAVIS, supra note 230,
at 126. He worked closely with SNCC's Stokely Carmichael. Id. Daniels was murdered and his
companion was seriously wounded in broad daylight in front of Varner's Cash Store in Haynesville;
an all-white jury acquitted Daniel's killer. Id. The following year, local blacks led by John Hulett
formed the Lowndes County Freedom Organization and created an independent party under the insignia
of the Black Panther. Id. at 126-29; CHARLES W. EAGLES, OUTSIDE AGITATOR: JON DANIELS AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN ALABAMA 255-56 (1993). Badly disillusioned by his experiences in the
South, Carmichael later became chairman of SNCC and led it along the path of Black Power. Eagles,
supra at 256. Anti-racist black militants in California later organized themselves into the Black
Panther Party, appropriating the name from the Lowndes civil rights activists. Id. at 255.
297. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 102.
298. See Lawson, Debating the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 152, at 31-33.
299. Id. at 103.
300. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 307.
301. Id.
302. Id.; GARROW, supra note 21, at 36-39.
303. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 307; GARROW, supra note 21, at 36-41. An innovative approach
to the voting rights problem came from an unlikely place and helped shape the thinking of both the
Johnson administration and Congress. Federal District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson of Alabama was
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The Selma demonstrations narrowed the options and forced Johnson's hand.34'

Throughout January and February, the President closely monitored events in
Alabama and held meetings at the White House with King, who explained that the
problems were serious enough to warrant more immediate and extensive legislation
than a constitutional amendment." 5 Johnson agreed, and the Justice Department
began drafting a bill that suspended literacy tests in state and federal elections
where the percentage of registered blacks fell below a prescribed level.30 6 After

Bloody Sunday and Governor Wallace's continued intransigence against
safeguarding peaceful black demonstrators, Johnson proposed legislation to crush

suffrage discrimination.30 7 In a momentous televised address to a joint session of
Congress on March 15, the President announced that keeping blacks from voting
was "wrong--deadly wrong," and voicing the
battle cry of the civil rights
30 8
movement, he pledged: "We shall overcome.

He meant what he said. His administration introduced the measure it had been
crafting for several months. Departing from reliance on cumbersome court
procedures, Johnson's voting rights bill shifted enforcement to the Justice
Department.30 9 It also targeted the states where blacks encountered the most
resistance when attempting to register. The bill triggered coverage in states and

counties that used a literacy test and where less than fifty percent of the population
had registered or gone to the polls in the 1964 presidential election.3 10 Under this

formula, the bill applied to Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina.3"1' Under the bill, literacy tests

experienced in trying to get local registration boards to comply with the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and
1960. Often frustrated by delays and subterfuges, in 1962, Judge Johnson decided to tackle the
continuing discriminatory application of literacy tests head on. See LAWSON, supra note 2, at 103.
Because so many whites had not been required to satisfy the literacy exams, Johnson "froze" the
requirements to vote that were then in effect, thereby allowing blacks to register. LAWSON, supra note
9, at 268. Thus, blacks only had to meet the same criteria as whites-not prove literacy-to enroll to
vote. Id. This principle of freezing recognized the realities of the differential treatment of the races
in the South and provided a rationale to justify suspending the administration of literacy tests. Id. In
March 1965, in a case from Louisiana, the Supreme Court upheld freezing of voting standards as a
constitutional method of correcting past bias against blacks, thereby suspending the application of
literacy tests. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). Justice Hugo Black stated what
southern blacks had long known about literacy exams: "This is not a test but a trap, sufficient to stop
even the most brilliant man on his way to the voting booth." Id. The Court affirmed the lower court
decision issued by Judge John Minor Wisdom, one of a handful of progressive federal district judges
in the South, along with Frank Johnson and J. Skelly Wright, who ruled against discriminatory suffrage
procedures. Id.; JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 52 (1981).
304. See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 308.
305. Id. at 308-09.
306. LAWSON, supranote 2, at 110.
307. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 311-12.
308. Id. at 312 (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The
American Promise (March 15, 1965), 1 PUB.PAPERS 281, 283, 284 (1965)).
309. LAWSON, supra note 2, at 110.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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would be suspended in each of these states, the President could send federal
examiners to sign up voters in any of the counties therein, and none of these states
could change their suffrage regulations for five years without the permission of the
Department of Justice or a federal court in Washington, D.C.312
Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which had met with such fierce opposition
from southerners in Congress that deliberations dragged on for nearly a year before
the bill passed, the new voting rights legislation encountered mild resistance.313 The
vivid media coverage of black suffering in Selma had galvanized national support
of black enfranchisement.3" 4 A Gallup Poll taken during the Selma to Montgomery
march indicated that three-quarters of the American public favored voting rights
legislation, and nearly fifty percent of southerners also favored it.3 5 Furthermore,
President Johnson's electoral landslide in 1964 had swept into the Eighty-Ninth
Congress an increased and decidedly liberal Democratic majority. Given the
situation, southern lawmakers could scarcely defend restricting the right to vote and
concentrated instead on weakening coverage of the bill.3 16 They argued for
removing the statistical formula that ensnared seven southern states almost
exclusively.317 Yet they waged only a half-hearted fight because suffrage legislation
had generated widespread support.31 8 Richard Russell, the dean of southern
senators, whose physical strength was diminished because of illness, recognized that
his legislative clout on this issue was also weak. "If there is any
thing I could do,"
3 19
cast.
is
die
the
assume
I
but
it,
do
would
"I
lamented,
Russell
With passage assured, the legislative debate concentrated on details. Led by
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, liberals complained that
the administration had not addressed the issue of removing the poll tax requirement
in state elections, unlike ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which
eliminated the tax in federal elections. 32 0 At this time, only Alabama, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia imposed a poll tax.321 However, under the bipartisan
cooperation of Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and Minority Leader
Everett Dirksen of Illinois, the Senate refused to add a poll tax repealer to the
measure. 32 2 These leaders did not oppose the abolition of the poll tax, but they
questioned whether Congress could constitutionally do so without amending the

312. LAWSON, supra note 9, at 312-13.
313. Id. at 320-21.
314. LAWSON, supra note 2, at I11.
315. Id.
316. See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 317.
317. Id. The trigger also caught the state of Alaska, which had a literacy test and less than 50
percent voter turnout in 1964. Id. at 423 n. 117. The low turnout was likely due to geography and the
climate rather than to racial discrimination. Id.
318. Id. at 314.
319. Id. at 314.
320. DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 173 (1991).
321. Id.
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Constitution. 3 The administration backed up Mansfield and Dirksen, and the poll
tax ban remained outside the Senate version.324 On May 25, after a mere twentyfour hours of debate on the contents of the bill, the Senate voted to impose cloture,
thereby ending a filibuster that had hardly begun.325
The House version of the administration's bill moved more slowly.326
Republican leaders in the lower chamber, William McCulloch of Ohio and Gerald
Ford of Michigan, offered a substitute plan. 3 27 Rather than using a formula to
trigger application of voting rights enforcement, they suggested that the attorney
general appoint federal registrars to any county where he received twenty-five
verified complaints of voting discrimination.328 The McCulloch-Ford plan did not
suspend literacy tests in these areas; instead it applied the sixth-grade education
standard adopted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.329 In another important variation,
their measure allowed covered locations to free themselves from Justice Department
supervision of electoral procedures by merely complying with the rulings of the
federal registrar.33 ° McCulloch's efforts were genuine; he had been an important
figure in obtaining passage of the Civil Rights Act. He argued that the
administration's triggering formula was too mechanical and too broad, and he
wanted to tailor it to remedy ills only in those counties in which blacks filed written
complaints of mistreatment. 331 Regardless of McCulloch's intentions, southern
lawmakers jumped behind his version as a means of weakening voting rights
enforcement. 332 Nevertheless, their efforts
failed, and the House adopted the
333
July.
early
in
version
administration's
One final detail remained to be negotiated in the House version of the bill. The
House bill contained a provision repealing the poll tax in state elections, but the
Senate version did not. 3 34 President Johnson favored the Senate version, and he sent
Attorney General Katzenbach to persuade the legislative conference committee,
which was trying to reconcile the competing bills, to accept the Senate's version.335
He struck a compromise with lawmakers-the conferees removed the outright poll
tax ban and adopted language instructing the Department of Justice to file suit
against any state's use of poll tax qualifications for voting.336 Congressmen
broadened the bill beyond race to include linguistic minorities by extending the
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
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335.
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sixth grade literacy standard to non-English speaking residents.337 Ultimately, the
House and Senate passed the revised bill with provisions for the triggering formula,
federal examiners, and Department of Justice oversight firmly in place.338
Finally, Johnson needed only to affix his signature to the law. Johnson wanted
to do so amidst great fanfare. He chose to sign the measure in the same room in the
Capitol Rotunda that Abraham Lincoln used to stamp his approval on a law granting
freedom to slaves owned by members of the Confederacy. 339 On August 6, the
President gathered behind him a delegation of civil rights leaders, congressional
supporters, and administration officials to witness this landmark occasion.34 °
Johnson proclaimed, "Today what is perhaps the last of the legal barriers is
tumbling. 34'
As Johnson understood, passage alone did not resolve the problem.
Enfranchisement depended on enforcement of the Act. The administration tried to
demonstrate its fortitude by dispatching federal examiners from the Justice
Department into nine counties less than three days after signing the bill into law.342
Among these counties were two that had commanded the civil rights movement's
greatest attention and sacrifice: Dallas County, Alabama, where Selma was located,
and Leflore County, Mississippi, where SNCC and COFO had valiantly toiled.343
In Dallas County the percent of African Americans signed up to vote rose from 2.1
percent in 1965 to 70.4 percent in 1968. 3" Black voters in Leflore County saw their
percent skyrocket from 2.1 percent to 72.2 percent.345
While enforcement of the 1965 Act proceeded, South Carolina challenged its
constitutionality in the Supreme Court.3 46 South Carolina, joined by five other

southern states, contended that Congress had exceeded its power in implementing
the Fifteenth Amendment.3 47 The states argued that by enacting both the triggering
formula and a Department of Justice veto of changes in election laws in the covered
jurisdictions, Congress encroached upon the reserved powers of the states, treated
states unequally, and adjudicated guilt without due process of law.348 Speaking for
the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected these claims.349

He stated that

Congress had legitimately decided that the case-by-case approach of litigation did
not work, and because of the history of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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Amendment over the previous century, Congress could constitutionally place the
burden of equal protection on "the perpetrators of the evil. 35 °
Over the next four years, the results were striking throughout the South.
Although the federal government did not dispatch examiners to all the counties that
warranted them-58 of 185 counties where less than 50 percent of blacks were
enrolled received them-the mere suspension of literacy tests provided a potent
boost for black registration.15 1 Encouraged by the 1965 Act, the Southern Regional
Council initiated a second Voter Education Project in 1966.352 Thus, by 1969, the
proportion of registered blacks in the South swelled to an average of around 60.7
percent, up from 24.4 percent in 1965. 353 In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled in the
case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 35 4 that the poll tax violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against the poor
in voting.355 Thus, the final remaining obstacle installed by post-Reconstruction
governments to limit black suffrage had finally fallen.
Typically, these achievements did not come without more sorrow. For
example, Vernon Dahmer had been a leader of the movement in Hattiesburg.356 A
cotton farmer, grocery store owner, sawmill operator and NAACP member,
Dahmer had opened his home to freedom riders and voter registration workers.357
After passage of the Voting Rights Act, Dahmer's grocery store became a place
where blacks could pay their poll taxes; Dahmer even offered to pay the tax for
those who could not afford it." 8 In the early morning hours of January 26, 1966,
Klansmen targeted Dahmer's house and adjacent store.359 They set fire to his store
and tossed Molotov cocktails through his house windows.36 Dahmer bravely
evacuated his family members while firing his rifle at the assailants. 361 The flames
and smoke inhalation from the blaze left him severely wounded, and Dahmer died
later that day from his injuries.362 The rest of his family survived.363 Four of sixteen

Klansman were convicted for Dahmer's murder. 364 Not until 1998, when
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Sam Bowers, the Ku Klux Klan's
Mississippi authorities reopened the case, 3was
65
leader, found guilty of murdering Dahmer.
The quest of African Americans for the right to vote demonstrates that
acquisition of the franchise came not from a benevolent willingness of public
officials to honor their commitment to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. It did not
result from either the majesty of a single individual, no matter how impressive Dr.
King was, or from one great event like Selma. Rather, it came at great personal risk
to courageous and dedicated civil rights crusaders, including Sam Block, Fannie
Lou Hamer, Bob Moses, James Cheney, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman,
and Jimmie Lee Jackson, and resulted from their determined strategy of grassroots
organizing and sustained pressure on the federal government. Even with passage of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, debates over enforcement did not end, and suffragists
had to come up with innovative strategies to guarantee the right to vote and to make
the casting of the ballot an effective tool for racial equality.
In August 2007, several of the most significant provisions of the Voting Rights
Act will come up for renewal.366 The history of the Voting Rights Act clearly

indicates that the right to vote is not an abstract ideal around which Americans
unite, but a primary badge of citizenship that has been fiercely contested along
racial lines. If we tear down the safeguard of federal protection and oversight,
recent history gives us reason to believe that the franchise will once again become
a source of racial contention and conflict. The struggle has not yet ended.

365. Rick Bragg, JurorsConvict FormerWizard in Klan Murder, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1998,
at Al.
366. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Voting Section, Voting Rights Act Clarification,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/clarify3.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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